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Neutrality, at least as a legal concept, existed neither in antiquity nor during
the Middle Ages.! It may well be that some international practice hardened
into a customary law of neutrality in the 18th and 19th centuries, a
development owing much to the theory and practice of the United States,2
but the traditional legal edifice, structurally uncertain at the best of times,
was badly shaken by the contrary usages of the 20th century's two world
wars and nowadays, in terms of practice, the neutrality laws have sunk into
a condition of "chronic obsolescence."3 In terms of theory, article 2(4) of
the Charter of the United Nations makes war technically illegal,4 and, there
being neither formal "belligerents" nor "neutrals," the "rights and duties
of the old law of neutrality have terminated with the Charter."5
What, then, to make of Chapter 7 of the new Commander's Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations: "The Law of Neutrality?"6 There are good
English-language accounts of the traditional rules of the law of neutrality
in the treatises ofOppenheim,7 Colombos,8 and O'Connell.9 A thoroughgoing
account of the history of neutrality is to be found in Jessup's impressive four
volumes. tO The Commander's Handbook means to give a brief rendition of the
traditionallaw. ll How might it do better? Three ideas come to mind.
First, the Commander's Handbook ought to acknowledge that modem
international theory and practice rarely deal with "belligerents" and
"neutrals" in their traditional senses. Virtually every paragraph of Chapter
7 makes reference to "belligerents" and the introductory wording that "it
has become increasingly difficult to determine with precision the point in
time when hostilities have become a 'war' and to distinguish belligerent
nations from those not participating in the conflict" only makes matters
worse.!2 The point is that doctrine and practice no longer try to decide what
is formally "war" and what is formally "peace." There are simply conflicts
between nations which involve the use of force and/or economic sanctions.
These conflicts usually entangle third states more or less uninterested in the
outcome, but hopeful of remaining on friendly terms with both sides in the
dispute. These third states are what we still call "neutrals," but they are no
longer "neutrals" in the context of the traditional rules.
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Second, Chapter 7 ought to abandon its more or less unskeptical treatment
of the traditional law of neutrality. Its approach seems to be grounded on
the commentary of observers like O'Connell and Baxter who have argued
that, in theory at least, the old law of neutrality may still come into play
if the United Nations fails to act at a time of armed conflict. 13 But this is
a .minority point-of-view. Most commentators agree that the technical
abolition of "war" has also technically abolished the old laws of neutrality.
Quincy Wright, for example, refutes Baxter simply and plainly: [NJeutrality
in principle cannot exist. "14 Kussbach writes: "It seems clear that the rules
of international law concerning neutral trading are applicable only when the
state of neutrality itself is called into being, i.e., when a state of war exists. "15
Moreover, whatever the outcome of the doctrinal debate about the legal
effect of the U.N. Charter, even the most energetic proponents of the
traditional elaboration must admit that there is little in modern practice to
substantiate their theoretical preference. O'Connell himself observes
respecting blockade (a topic which, along with its related rules respecting
contraband and visit and search, absorbs most of Chapter 7'5 attention):
"There has been practically no experience of blockade since 1945 to test the
matter. "16 More realistically, Admiral Miller, dating the demise of traditional
blockades to the uniform practice of the two world wars, has argued that
it makes little sense to cling in theory to out-moded rules when "a new look
is required at the legal framework by which the community seeks to regulate
the conflict. "17 And McNulty makes good sense, not only about the rules of
blockade specifically but about the laws of neutrality in general, when he
writes about the legal and practical climate after 1945:
In point of fact, it seems ludicrous to contemplate the possibility of any meaningful
observance of the "legal" code of blockade in the current or predictable state of political
reality. It is clear that the rules of blockade came into existence solely to protect the
ordinary sea commerce of neutrals and to regulate the circumstances under which such
trade could be interrupted. The rules derive out of a 19th century legal regime-a regime
oriented toward regulating the conduct of states in war and peace. But modern
international law, of which blockade is a part, no longer seeks to regulate war but to
prevent its occurrence.l8

Looking to recent events, Lauterpacht sees little modern practice of a
traditional neutral-belligerent sort. In the Vietnam and Yemen conflicts, for
example, there was no attempt "to require states not immediately involved
to adopt positions of 'neutrality'. "19 And Norton, in a very helpful 1976
survey,ZO concludes that "[rJecent armed conflicts have provided little cause
to invoke the maritime rights and duties of the law of neutrality. "21 Looking
at the United Nations naval blockade of North Korea in the Korean War
and the Kuomintang blockade of the Communist Chinese, he decides the first
"was only of marginal significance" because the North Korean supply routes
were overland,22 while the second was futile because the naval powers rejected
it for being ineffective. 23 Norton does find three examples of visit and search:
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Egypt's contraband system through the Suez Canal in the 1948 and 1956 ArabIsraeli wars, India's and Pakistan's contraband lists in their 1965 conflict, and
France's searches of merchant ships in the Algerian War of Independence.24
But he concludes that all three visit and search cases are "anomalous" since
in France's case, "the rights were improperly invoked" and in the other two
cases "the belligerents relying upon these rights had virtually no navies and
therefore could only apply them to neutral vessels coming within the
belligerents' own waters."25
In the Iran-Iraq war there has been a case made that traditional neutral
rights and duties are still at stake. Shortly after the war began in September
1980, both Iran and Iraq declared war or "exclusion" zones.26 Iraq's only major
oil port was destroyed early in the fighting and it developed over-land pipeline
routes, but Iran continued to rely on shipping oil. Beginning in 1984, Iraq
began to strike at Iranian shipping and Iran at third country shipping,
especially shipping ofIraq's friendly neighbors; altogether between 1984 and
1987, Iraq attacked 234 ships and Iran 163 ships.27 Iran has also visited and
searched a large number of ships in the Gulf.28 Beginning in 1987, Iran mined
shipping lanes in the Gulf.29 Employing traditional law of neutrality concepts,
it has been argued that:
[T]he Persian Gulf belligerents, particularly Iran, have systematically violated the
rights of neutral shipping. Nonbelligerent merchant vessels that are engaged in neutral
commerce may not be attacked indiscriminately, as Iran has been doing.30

On the other hand, it has been pointed out that whether such shipping is
"neutral" or not depends on how you decide the question of whether a
country, such as Kuwait, whose vessels are attacked, is truly a non-belligerent
when the country is a direct financial supporter of Iraq.31 Furthermore,
looking to the United Nations Charter and to the protection of reflagged
Kuwaiti tankers by the United States, Professor Henkin has argued:
In the Gulf, some spokesman said recently, the United States remains formally neutral.
But even if the concept of neutrality can still apply in some cases, can the United States
be neutral here? No one would accuse us of being a friend of Iran, but there is a strong
case that Iraq is probably the aggressor. No one has mentioned that for some years now.
It is true that the Security Council refrained from so holding, in part because the United
States would not have permit [sic] it, or because the Russians would not permitted [sic]
it. That raises some questions, but that doesn't change the law. In the absence of a
Security Council determination that one party was the aggressor, do the laws of the
Charter not apply? In the absence of such a finding by the Security Council, are states
free to be neutral even if it is clear that one side had launched the war in violation
of the Charter? ...
Is Kuwait neutral, or is it, as the first speaker suggested, perhaps a co-belligerent?
Is the United States supporting Kuwait, and, if so, are we also co-belligerents? If so,
we may be not only supporting the aggressor-but if the old laws of war apply-we
also may be violating the laws of war.
I suggest we may not only have slipped into the war but, from the international
lawyer's point ofview, we seem to have slipped into a particular position on international
law without much thought about it and without any thought to the long-term
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consequences. In fact, we seem to be taking seriously the outdated laws of war, but
not the contemporary law against war. In the process we may have eroded both. At
least, it cannot be said that the law on neutrality and belligerency is what it was before
1945.32

This is not to say that rules about neutrals might no longer be useful, only
that a rendition of the traditional rules, whether they be read in full in
Oppenheim or Colomb os or in brief in the Commander's Handbook, no longer
either describes practice or easily comports with theory. I agree that the object
of the neutrality exercise should remain much what Chapter 7 says it ought
to be: "to localize war, to limit the conduct of war on both land and sea,
and to lessen the impact of war on international commerce."33 But a faithful
account of antique rules is simply not a realistic way to proceed.
Take, for example, the 1962 United States quarantine of strategic arms to
Cuba. As Miller points out, "the United States could have declared war on
Cuba, established a blockade, or announced lists of contraband items; although
undoubtedly, many would have cried that the declaration of war, itself, was
violative of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter."34 Rather, because "traditional
'blockade' implies and requires a state of belligerency or war, the United
States did not seek to justify the quarantine as a blockade. There was no
assertion of a state of war or belligerency. "35 Instead, the United States
fashioned the quarantine as a regional security action under the Rio Treaty
and in accord with article 53 of the U.N. Charter.36 It might also have been
justified as an exercise of a country's right of self-defense pursuant to Charter
article 51.37 In.any case, the quarantine fell short of full-scale armed conflict.
Indeed, the interference was intended to help establish a level of international
conflict well below that of traditional legal "war" or the "war" more or
less technically abolished by the United Nations' Charter.
If my second proposition is right, that given the doctrinal quandaries and
practical problems besetting the "shadowy existence" of the law of
neutrality,38 the Commander's Handbook does not give that subject that "certain
measure of scepticism" which most observers feel it dese.rves,39 what is to
be done? Booth has suggested that since "[w]ar is rarely declared ... it is
incumbent upon military organizations ... to make officers conversant with
the background to the general rules oflaw governing military operations short
of war."40 My third proposition is that Chapter 7 ought to explain that
whatever we do have for rules respecting neutrality, even when they are
invoked, they fall short of being the same sort of international law that is
described in some other parts of the Commander's Handbook. Looking, for
example, at the law about "Legal Divisions of the Oceans and Airspace, "41
"International Status and Navigation of Warships and Military Aircraft,"42
and "Protection of Persons and Property at Sea, "43 one sees, in my opinion,
a much "harder" law than one observes reviewing the law of neutrality. It
is, I think, unrealistic to assume that all international law is of the same
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certainty or of the same legally binding effect. To do so casts unwarranted
shadows of uncertainty and ineffectiveness on the more successful forms of
the law of nations.
It was John Austin, the English legal positivist, who wrote in 1832:
[T]hat the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law
is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its
author.... [T]he law obtaining between nations is law (improperly so called) set by
general opinion. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear
on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility,
and incurring its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received
and respected.44

As early as 1836, international lawyers were having to cope with Austin's
critique of their discipline as being merely a form of morality.45 And, although
some are satisfied as to the law-like quality of international law, others are
doubtful. H.L.A. Hart, for example, in a modem reformulation of legal
positivism, argues that international law is more like primitive law than like
municipal law because international law lacks "the formal structure of ... a
legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction and officially organized
•
sanctlOns
.... "46
However, neither Austin's nor Hart's nor most other general
jurisprudential characterizations of international law pay particular attention
to the diversity of international law. That is, most discussions of the problems
of the certainty and efficacy of international law assume that there is a system,
uncertain and ineffective though it may be, of international law and suppose
that there is something like a single general integrated, if not hierarchial,
international legal process. Reality is otherwise.
Various forms of international law vary along what might be called a
"structural spectrum," there being "a great variety of international legal
systems, some more structured than others. "47 In some of its forms, for
example, the system regulating nuclear weapons, international law may be
so unstructured in terms of both rule-specificity and rule-enforcement as to
be, at best, a sort of Hart's so-called "primitive law."48 In some other of its
emanations, for example, the systems pertaining to the European Economic
Community 'and to European Human Rights Law, international law may be
so well-structured in terms of rule-specificity and rule-enforcement as to be
virtually as "hard" as any ordinary domestic law. 49
Given the diversity of international legal systems, we should assume that
there will be differences in the certainty of their rules and the efficacy of
their enforcement processes. In analyzing the relationships between law and
society, Max Weber, at the tum of the century, defined "law" as "an order
system endowed with certain specific guaranties of the probability of its
empirical validity."so Weber's necessary "guarantees" for law are more
sophisticated than Austin's necessary "sovereigns" for law. Weber wrote of
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a "coercive apparatus, i.e., that there are one or more persons whose special
task it is to hold themselves ready to apply specially provided means of
coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement." The coercive
apparatus" may use psychological as well as physical means of coercion and
may operate directly or indirectly against the participants in the system.51
Weber's conceptual framework is, I submit, a more useful and realistic way
to understand the nature and diversity of international law than the theories
provided by Austin and Hart.
Looking back to neutrality, it is helpful to remember that "the rules of
neutrality are products of two forces pulling in opposite directions, the final
result being determined by the relative bargaining power of the parties. "52
This is not a promising circumstance, either for the elaboration of certain
rules or for the efficacious enforcement of those rules. Indeed, in great wars,
whether they be the Napoleonic Wars or the World Wars, the legal system
of neutrality has been apt to collapse altogether.53
It may be that there will be periods of time, such as that between 1815
and 1914, when, because of the conditions of international politics, there will
be a sufficient consensus to generate generally accepted rules and a coercive
apparatus for a law of neutrality.54 Moreover, even in times of uncertainty
and inefficacy, there may be occasional authorities which will pronounce an
illegality under the law of neutrality. 55 However, for the most part, the rules
respecting "neutrality" or what Fenwick preferred to call "nonparticipation"56 will be rules tailor-made to fit particular conflicts and will
neither be norms of general specificity nor will they be enforced by a coercive
apparatus comparable to that available for "harder" forms of international
law.
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